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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5840 
TOWN OF NEW PALTZ, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5840 
Included: Court Clerk-Typist and Clerk to the Town Justice. 
Excluded: All other titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S^Hite, Member 
Sheila S. "Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF EAST HAMPTON PUBLIC SAFETY 
DISPATCHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5856 
VILLAGE OF EAST HAMPTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE VILLAGE OF EAST HAMPTON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of East Hampton Public Safety 
o Certification - C-5856 - 2 -
Dispatchers Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Public Safety Dispatcher I and II. 
Excluded: Public Safety Dispatcher III and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Village of East Hampton Public Safety Dispatchers 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Kite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5850 
VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 456, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5850 - 2 -
Included: Full-time employees in Civil Service titles of Laborers and 
Maintenance Laborers who are assigned to the Village's Facilities 
Maintenance Department and who work outside of Village Hall. 
Excluded: All others, including Laborers assigned to Village Hall who are 
represented by CSEA. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Gole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5823 
TOWN OF SAUGERTIES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5823 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the Landfill, Animal Control 
and Water/Wastewater Treatment Departments. 
Excluded: Water/Wastewater Superintendent. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, 
AFT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5870 
KIPP AMP ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.1 
1
 The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) made his 
determination, pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) on 
March 26, 2009. The Board has not received written objections to the Director's 
determination from either party pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules. 
Certification - C-5870 -2 
Included: Teachers, Learning Specialists, Social Workers, Counselors, 
Deans and School Operations Manager. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefffowitz, Offairman 
/^uS / j/r^, 
Robert S. fl~ite, Member 
__>-
/ Sheila S.^Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5857 
COLD SPRING HARBOR FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5857 
- 2 -
Included: All Fire House Attendants. 
Excluded: Fireman, Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs, Clericals, Supervisors, 
Administrators and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S.^Hite, lumber 
/ ' Sheila L. C6le, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5853 
THREE VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
Certification - C-5853 -2 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All Monitors and Special Education Aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S.fTite, Member 
Sheila S('Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5847 
MAHOPAC CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
I ntervenor/l ncu mbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
Certification - C-5847 -2 
grievances. 
Included: Senior Stenographers, Stenographers, Senior Account Clerks, 
Account Clerks, Senior Typists, Typist, Senior Clerks, Clerk-Typist, 
Teacher Aides, Special Education, Teacher Aides, Library Aides, 
Purchasing Agents, Jr. Accountant, Accountant, Accountant I, 
SASI, Office Assistant, Sr., Office Assistant Principal Secretary, 
Personnel Assistant I, Personnel Assistant II, Senior Personnel 
Assistant, Payroll Clerk, Benefits Clerk, Sr., and Benefits Clerk. 
Excluded: The Clerk to the Board of Education, two Superintendent's 
Secretaries, Secretaries to all Assistant Superintendents, Deputy 
Superintendents and Assistants to the Superintendent. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
// Jerome Lefkowitz, Chajfrrian 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5819 
TOWN OF WOODSTOCK, 
Employer, 
- and -
COMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1120, 
I ntervenor/l ncu mbent. 
GARY M. HICKEY, for Petitioner 
JEFF MORAN, for Employer 
AMY S. YOUNG, ESQ., for Intervenor/lncumbent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 16, 2008, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) filed, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, 
a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the Town of Woodstock (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Full-time and part-time employees classified as 
Case No. C-5819 -2-
Aide/Stenographer, Aide/Typist, Court Clerk, Dispatcher, Senior 
Dispatcher, Laborer, Water Sewage Treatment Plant Operator, 
Water/SEWER Superintendent and Youth Prgram Assistant. 
Excluded: Youth Program Director, Municipal Worker Supervisor, all other 
full-time and part-time personnel and all temporary personnel. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on February 27, 
2009, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
V J ? Q ^ / J 2 . 
Sheila S. Sole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WALLKILL POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27530 
- and -
TOWN OF WALLKILL, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY LLC (JOHN F. O'REILLY of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Town of Wallkill Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) and cross-exceptions by the Town of Wallkill (Town) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, filed on April 18, 2007, alleging that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to respond to three PBA 
written inquiries concerning the Town's intention with respect to complying with the 
negotiated disciplinary procedures contained in the parties' expired collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement). 
In lieu of a hearing, the parties agreed to a stipulated record which includes a 
stipulation of facts, exhibits and a videotape of a Town Board meeting on January 11, 
2007. In addition, the parties agreed to incorporate into the stipulated record the 
Case No. U-27530 -2-
pleadings and evidence in a related charge, Case No. U-27426. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the PBA contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing its charge 
based upon her conclusion that the Town complied with its obligations, pursuant to §§209-
a.1(a) and (d) of the Act, to respond to the PBA's information requests. The Town 
supports the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge but asserts in its cross-exceptions that 
the ALJ erred in concluding that the information sought by the PBA is relevant and 
necessary to the administration of the agreement or to collective negotiations. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse, in part, but affirm the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge. 
FACTS 
Article 29 of the parties' agreement contains a negotiated disciplinary procedure 
for Town police officers ending in binding arbitration. Under the agreement, the PBA 
expressly waives certain rights of bargaining unit members to the statutory disciplinary 
procedures set forth in Civ Serv Law §75 and Town Law §155. 
The agreement between the parties expired on December 31, 2003. Following 
an impasse in negotiations for a successor agreement, the dispute was referred to an 
interest arbitration panel pursuant to §209.4 of the Act. The panel held hearings on 
January 23, 2006, January 24, 2006 and March 8, 2006 without reaching a final 
determination. At all times relevant to the charge, the negotiation impasse between the 
parties remained unresolved. 
On December 27, 2006, a PBA representative sent a letter to the Town 
Supervisor stating that the PBA had received information from bargaining unit members 
indicating that the Town planned to discontinue compliance with the negotiated 
Case No. U-27530 -3-
,—, disciplinary procedures, effective January 1, 2007, and revert to Civ Serv Law §§75 and 
v ) 
76 procedures when disciplining bargaining unit members. In the December 27, 2006 
letter, the PBA asked the Town Supervisor to advise the PBA in writing, by January 5, 
2007, whether the information received from the bargaining unit members was accurate. 
After the Town failed to respond to the request for information by the date set in 
the December 27, 2006 letter, the PBA representative sent a follow-up letter, dated 
January 8, 2007. In the second letter, the PBA stated it had received a copy of a 
proposed Town local law, scheduled to be considered at a Town Board meeting on 
January 11, 2007, which would result in the establishment of a new disciplinary procedure 
for the PBA bargaining unit. The final paragraph of the PBA letter stated: 
The PBA demands again to know whether your office 
intends to abide by any local law concerning discipline or is 
otherwise discontinuing any part of the contractual 
) * disciplinary procedure. If I do not receive a written response 
to my inquiry by January 12th, the PBA will take your silence 
to mean that the Town will discontinue the contractual 
procedure and the PBA will act accordingly. 
During the January 11, 2007 meeting, the Town Attorney stated that the purpose of 
the proposed law was to establish Town police disciplinary procedures consistent with 
New York public policy as interpretated by the Court of Appeals. During the comment 
period, a PBA representative spoke in opposition to the proposed law. He expressed the 
PBA's frustration with the Town's failure to respond to the two requests for information 
which he stated impaired the ability of the parties to resolve their negotiations. At the 
hearing, the Town Supervisor and the Town Attorney did not respond either explicitly or 
«implicitly to the PBA's requests for information. Neither did the Town respond by the 
January 12, 2007.date set by the PBA. 
""" On January 25, 2007, the Town Board enacted Local Law No. 2 of 2007 (Local 
Case No. U-27530 -4-
Law) which created a new Town police disciplinary procedure and directed the Police 
Chief to take all necessary steps to implement the new procedure. The stated intent of 
the legislation was to establish a police disciplinary procedure, pursuant to Town Law 
§§154 and 155, in accordance with its interpretation of the decision in Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board1 (hereinafter, NYCPBA). The Local Law does not refer to 
Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76. 
On February 5, 2007, the PBA sent a third request to the Town Supervisor for 
information with respect to the Town's plans following the enactment of the Local Law. 
The letter stated, in part: 
On behalf of the PBA, it demands to know whether your 
office intends to abide by the local law concerning discipline 
or is otherwise discontinuing any part of the contractual 
disciplinary procedure. If I do not receive a written response 
to my inquiry by February 9th, the PBA will take your silence 
to mean that the Town will discontinue the contractual 
disciplinary procedure and the PBA will act accordingly. 
On March 8, 2007, the PBA filed charge U-27426 alleging that the Town violated 
§§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the Act when it implemented the Local Law. 
Prior to the filing of the present charge, the Town did not respond either in writing 
or orally to the PBA's three requests for information. The Town's first written response to 
the PBA requests is contained in a letter to the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) dated June 13, 2007, during the processing of the charge. 
In that letter, the Town' s counsel stated: 
I also write to state for the record with respect to the above 
referenced Charge and the Charge in Case No. U27426 that 
1
 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB 1J7006 (2006). ' 
Case No. U-27530 -5-
the Town of Wallkill will implement Town Local Law No. 2 of 
2007 with respect to matters concerning members of the 
Wallkill Police Department which are covered by the Local 
Law. 
Between the enactment of the Local Law on January 25, 2007 and the Town's 
June 1.3, 2007 letter, there were no grievances or demands for arbitration filed or 
pending with respect to Article 29 of the agreement. During the same period, the Town 
neither commenced, nor had pending, disciplinary charges against PBA bargaining unit 
members brought pursuant to the Local Law. However, the interest arbitration panel 
continued to deliberate in executive sessions during this period and it issued a final 
award and decision on September 4, 2007. The issues determined by the panel did not 
include police disciplinary procedures. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the Act, an employee organization has a general right to receive 
requested information and documents from an employer for use by the employee 
organization in negotiations, to resolve negotiation impasses and in the administration 
of an agreement. The failure of an employer to respond to a request or to provide the 
requested information and documents may constitute a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (d) 
of the Act.2 There are three primary limitations to the general right to receive requested 
information: reasonableness, relevancy and necessity.3 Each request for information 
that satisfies this standard, which is refused by an employer, constitutes a separate 
2
 Board of Education of the City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 PERB 1J3012 (1973); 
Hornell Cent Sch Dist, 9 PERB 1J3032 (1976); V7//age of Johnson City, 12 PERB 1J3020 
(1979); State of New York (Dept of Health and Roswell Memorial Institute), 26 PERB 
H3072 (1993); City of Rochester, 29 PERB 1J3070 (1996). 
3
 Board of Education of the City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, supra, note 2; Hampton 
Bays Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 1J3008 (2008). 
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violation of the Act.4 
In Hampton Bays Union Free School District,5 we stated that the statutory 
obligation under the Act to provide a response to a request for information attaches 
when the necessity and relevancy of the requested information is reasonably 
discernible. In addition, we emphasized that although it may be a better practice for an 
employer to seek greater specificity when the necessity and relevancy of an information 
request is in doubt, it is not a statutory obligation under the Act. 
In State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations),6 the Board 
concluded that an employer did not violate the Act when it failed to provide a 
substantive response to an employee organization's request for information about 
whether the employer planned to pay increments at the future expiration of an 
agreement when the evidence established that the employer had not yet decided 
whether it would pay the increments. 
In its exceptions, the PBA challenges the ALJ's decision to dismiss the charge 
asserting that the ALJ erred in concluding that the Town responded to the PBA's three 
information requests. 
Contrary to the PBA's exceptions, the ALJ did not find that the Town responded 
to the PBA's initial December 27, 2006 request. Rather, she held that the Town's failure 
to respond to the initial request did not constitute a violation of the Act because the 
4
 Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch Dist, 33 PERB1J3059 (2000). 
5
 41 PERB 1J3008 (2008). 
6
 25 PERB 1J3078 (1992), confirmed sub nom., New York State Inspection, Security and 
Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82, AFSCME v Kinsella, 197 AD2d 341, 
27 PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 1994). 
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PBA's request was based upon faulty information and the PBA failed, under the 
circumstances, to provide the Town with a reasonable amount of time to respond. No 
exception was filed to this aspect of the ALJ's decision and, therefore, it is waived.7 
Furthermore, the PBA failed to establish a rationale justifying the short period of time it 
set for the Town to respond during a holiday season. 
We next turn to the PBA's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the 
Town responded to the PBA's January 8, 2007 and February 5, 2007 requests for 
information. 
If a party chooses to draft a request for information stating that a failure to 
respond will be treated as an admission by the recipient to certain facts, a non-response 
can satisfy the request under the Act. Although a request for information must be 
sufficiently particular so that necessity and relevancy of the information is reasonably 
discernible, the Act does not mandate a party to draft an information request in a form 
similar to a request for admission or in a form similar to an interrogatory under federal or 
state civil procedure rules. Indeed, requests for information under the Act "are intended 
to be less formal and narrower in scope than permissible discovery in litigation."8 
Based on the wording of the PBA's January 8, 2007 and February 5, 2007 
requests, we agree with the ALJ's conclusion that the Town's silence constitutes a 
reasonable and substantive response to those requests. The two requests make clear 
7
 PERB's Rules of Procedure §213.2(b)(4); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 
(2007), confirmed sub nom, Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
40 PERB H7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007); County of Sullivan and Sullivan County 
Sheriff, 41 PERB 1J3006 (2008). 
8
 State of New York-Unified Court System, 41 PERB 1J3009 at 3060 (2008), vacated on 
other grounds, Pfau vNew York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 875 NYS2d 747, 42 PERB 
U7003 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2009). 
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that the Town's failure to respond would constitute an admission to a clearly stated 
proposition: the Town will be discontinuing the negotiated disciplinary procedure. 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the Town's non-response to those 
requests satisfied any duty the Town may have had under the Act. 
Finally, we consider the Town's cross-exceptions which challenge the ALJ's 
conclusion that the substance of the information sought by the PBA was relevant to the 
administration of the agreement. Under the facts and circumstances in the present 
case, we conclude that the PBA's requests for information were not relevant to the 
administration of the agreement. 
The necessity and relevancy of the PBA's December 27, 2006 request is not 
reasonably discernible from the letter's content or when read in conjunction with other 
evidence in the stipulated record. The record is silent as to whether, at the time of the 
PBA's initial request, there was a notice of discipline pending against a unit member or 
that a disciplinary investigation had been commenced.9 Furthermore, there is no 
evidence in the record that, at the time of the request/the Town had made a decision to 
abandon the negotiated disciplinary procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the PBA 
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that its initial information request was relevant 
and necessary under the Act. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the PBA's two subsequent 
requests for information. According to the stipulated record, between January 25, 2007 
and June 13, 2007 there were no grievances or demands for arbitration filed or pending 
9
 There is also no evidence in the record establishing that the information requested 
was relevant to the proposals under consideration before the interest arbitration panel 
or that the PBA was preparing for future negotiations. 
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underthe disciplinary article of the agreement. In addition, the stipulated record states 
that during the same period, the Town did not invoke the Local Law's disciplinary 
procedures against PBA bargaining unit members. The record is silent as to whether a 
PBA unit member was the subject of a pending disciplinary investigation. Finally, the 
evidence contained in the stipulated record does not support the PBA's argument that 
the requested information was needed by the PBA in order to file a grievance or to 
prepare for future collective negotiations. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the PBA's exceptions, grant the Town's 
cross-exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing the PBA's charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
f / yWK^ 
Jerome Lewowitz, 2fnairman 
J 
rw /u^c^ 
Robert S. Hite, Board Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Board Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Albany (City) to a 
decision by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) on an improper practice charge filed by the New York State Law 
Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 2841 (Council 82) 
alleging that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally revised a disciplinary rule of conduct entitled "Use of Alcohol Off-
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sj Duty" to prohibit bargaining unit employees from consuming any intoxicating beverage 
within eight hours before the start of a scheduled tour of duty.1 
Foregoing the presentation of witnesses at the hearing, the parties submitted the 
case for decision on a stipulated record to the Assistant Director. The pleadings, along 
with a written joint stipulation of facts, supplemented before the Assistant Director on 
May 23, 2007 comprise the entire stipulated record. 
Based upon the stipulated record, the Assistant Director found that the City had 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally promulgating and implementing the eight-
hour rule restricting off-duty conduct by Council 82 unit members. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The City's exceptions contend that the Assistant Director made various errors of 
^ fact and law in concluding that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Specifically, it 
asserts that the Assistant Director erred in finding that: a) Police Chief Tuffey (Tuffey), 
at a July 17, 2006 meeting between the City and Council 82, refused to engage in 
negotiations with respect to the eight-hour rule; b) the City failed to present evidence 
demonstrating that the prior policy was ineffective thereby requiring the more restrictive 
rule; c) the unilateral change in the City's police off-duty policy is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations because it affects terms and conditions of employment; d) the subject 
matter of the charge, a police disciplinary rule, is not a prohibited subject of negotiations 
pursuant to the Court of Appeals' 2006 decision in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association 
of the City of New York, Inc., v New York State Public Employment Relations Board* 
(hereinafter, NYCPBA) and other case law; e) the Second Class Cities Law §133 is not 
/ 1 41 PERB 1J4512(2008). 
2
 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB 1J7006 (2006). 
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a special law and therefore does not render police discipline a prohibited subject of 
negotiations. 
Council 82 supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
BOARD REQUEST FOR FILING AMICUS BRIEFS 
Following the filing of the City's exceptions and Council 82's response, the Board 
issued a notice inviting interested entities to submit amici briefs relating to a specific issue 
of state-wide importance: 
Whether the Second Class Cities Law and the Albany City 
Code constitute laws rendering the subject of police 
discipline in the City of Albany a prohibited subject of 
bargaining? 
Three such briefs were filed, with each supporting the position of the City that the 
subject matter of the charge is a prohibited subject of negotiations. 
FACTS 
As noted above, the City and Council 82 entered into a joint stipulation of 
facts which states: 
1. The New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO is the duly certified 
bargaining agent for all employees of the City of Albany who 
are members of the Patrol, Communications and Civilians 
bargaining units of Local 2841, Albany Police Officers Union. 
2. The City of Albany is a public employer within the meaning 
of the Act. 
3. On or about June 4, 2006, the Police Department instituted a 
change in its Departmental Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP). Specifically, the Department modified Article 14.1 of 
the SOP, entitled 'Discipline-Rules of Conduct" by adding to 
the rule an off-duty ban on members from "consuming any 
intoxicating beverage within EIGHT hours of reporting for 
their next tour of Duty.' See, Charge at Exhibit A. 
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4. The SOP as it existed prior to this charge required members 
to 'refrain from consuming intoxicating beverages to the 
extent that it results in impairment, intoxication, obnoxious or 
offensive behavior which discredits them or the department, 
or renders the member unfit to report for duty for their next 
regular tour of duty.' See Charge at Exhibit B. 
5. By letter dated June 22, 2006, the Union informed Police 
Chief James Tuffey that it believed this to be a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, and requested a meeting to discuss 
and negotiate the issue. See Charge at Exhibit C. 
6. A meeting was subsequently held on or about July 17, 2006, 
where the Union and the Police Chief discussed the 
changes to the rule on use of alcohol off-duty but Chief 
Tuffey refused to negotiate the issue and stood steadfast on 
the new rule. 
7. The Union thereafter filed the instant improper practice charge. 
At the scheduled hearing before the Assistant Director, the parties chose to 
supplement their joint written stipulation on the record rather than call witnesses to 
testify. In the supplemental stipulation, the parties agreed to the following: 
1. The policy was implemented to avoid incidents wherein 
officers would come to work not fully fit for duty, impaired, 
under the influence of intoxicating substances and/or with 
alcohol on their breath; 
2. Prior to implementing the SOP change, the police chief 
consulted with medical professionals regarding blood alcohol 
levels and implemented the eight-hour ban based upon that 
consultation; 
3. It is considered [sic] that the public expects that the police 
officers employed to protect them would not be permitted to 
engage in activity that would impair or affect their judgment; 
4. It was also considered that other professions such as airline 
pilots have stricter restrictions. 
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DISCUSSION 
We begin with consideration of the City's exceptions which challenge portions of 
the Assistant Director's decision premised on her analysis of the facts in the stipulated 
record. In Part B, our decision turns to the legal arguments by the City and amici 
asserting that the Assistant Director erred in failing to conclude that the subject matter of 
the charge is a prohibited subject. 
A(1) Alleged Factual Errors with Respect to the July 17, 2006 Meeting 
The City contends that the Assistant Director erred in her factual finding that Chief 
Tuffey, at the July 17, 2006 meeting with Council 82, refused to negotiate with respect to 
the more restrictive eight-hour rule. According to the City, the record demonstrates that 
Tuffey only refused to accept the terms proposed by Council 82. We disagree. 
Although provided with an opportunity, the City did not call Tuffey or any other 
witness to testify with respect to what took place during the July 17, 2006 meeting. 
Instead, the City entered into a written stipulation explicitly stating that, at the meeting, 
Council 82 "and the Police Chief discussed the changes to the rule on use of alcohol off-
duty but Chief Tuffey refused to negotiate the issue and stood steadfast on the new rule." 
(emphasis added) 
Based upon the explicit terms of the stipulation, along with the lack of any 
inconsistent or contrary testimonial evidence in the record, we conclude that this 
exception is without merit. 
A(2) Alleged Errors In Finding the Rule Change to be a Mandatory Subject 
In its exceptions, the City contends that the Assistant Director erred in concluding 
that the eight-hour rule affects a term and condition of employment and that the record 
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does not support a finding that the relationship between the rule and the City's mission 
outweighs the right of Council 82 to negotiate the change. 
First, it is well-settled under the Act, that an employer's restriction on the use of 
non-working time by employees is a term and condition of employment and, in general, 
constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations.3 However, the Board has long applied a 
balancing test to determine whether a unilateral promulgation or alteration of a work rule 
violates the Act.4 In applying this balancing test, we examine the record to determine 
whether there is preponderance of credible evidence to demonstrate that the employer's 
need for a particular mission-related work rule outweighs the effect that the rule has on 
the employees' terms and conditions of employment. The mere fact that a work rule has 
a relationship to an employer's mission does not permit an employer to act unilaterally in 
any manner it deems appropriate.5 Rather, an employer can unilaterally impose a work 
rule only to the extent that the unilateral action does not significantly or unnecessarily 
intrude on the protected interests of bargaining unit employees under the Act. Therefore, 
under the balancing test the burden rests with the employer to demonstrate that the new 
3
 Buffalo Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn, 9 PERB1J3024 (1976); Local 589, Intl Assn of 
Fire Fighters, 16 PERB 1J3030 (1983); Ulster County Sheriff, 27 PERB fl3028 (1994); 
City of Buffalo (Police Dept), 23 PERB 1J3050 (1990); City of Glens Falls, 24 PERB 
U3015 (1991), petition to review dismissed, 25 PERB 1T7016 (3d Dept 1992). 
4
 County of Rensselaer, 13 PERB 1J3080 (1980); Steuben-Allegany BOCES, 13 PERB 
1J3096 (1980); State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 18 PERB 
113064(1985). 
5
 County of Montgomery, 18 PERB 1f3077 (1985). 
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work rule does not go beyond what is necessary to further its mission.6 
Upon our review of the record in the present case, we conclude that the Assistant 
Director correctly found that the evidence clearly demonstrates that the City's prohibition 
against police officers consuming intoxicating beverages prior to reporting for duty is 
mission-related. However, we also concur with her that there is no evidence in the 
stipulated record to support the City's claim that the new eight-hour rule was necessary, 
or that the City faced a new or acute problem requiring a more stringent rule. 
The City's prior rule provided that officers were to "refrain from consuming 
intoxicating beverages to the extent that it results in impairment, intoxication, obnoxious 
or offensive behavior which discredits them or the department, or renders the member 
unfit to report for duty for their next regular tour of duty." Although the parties' stipulation 
states that the City consulted with medical professionals before it imposed the eight-hour 
rule, it does not identify what information or advice it received from those professionals. 
Furthermore, the stipulation does not include facts establishing that the prior policy had 
been ineffective or that the City had an immediate need to act unilaterally. 
While it is self-evident that the public has a right to expect that police officers will 
not report to work inebriated or under the influence of intoxicating beverages and 
6
 County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), 21 PERB1J3014 (1988). The City 
does not contend that the eight-hour rule is nonmandatory on the ground that it is 
purportedly integral to the City's primary mission and, therefore, that argument is 
waived. Rules of Procedure §213.2(b)(4);Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), 
confirmed sub nom., Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 
NYPER H 7008 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2007). See generally, West Irondequoit Bd ofEduc, 
4 PERB P070 (1971), mot for reargument denied, 4 PERB 1J3089 (1971), confirmed 
sub nom., West Irondequoit Teachers Assoc v. Helsby, 42 AD2d 808, 6 PERB 1J7010 
(3d Dept 1973), affd, 35 NY2d 46, 7 PERB 1J7014 (1974); County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff, 39 PERB 1J3016 (2006), confirmed sub nom., County of Erie and Erie 
County Sheriff v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 43 AD3d 1311, 40 PERB fl7007 (4th 
Dept 2007), revd 12 NY3d 72, 42 PERB 1J7002 (2009). 
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substances, there is absolutely nothing in this stipulated record to support the City's 
claim that the unilateral implementation of the new eight-hour rule was necessary for the 
City to accomplish this goal. Both the Board and the Assistant Director are constrained 
by the facts the parties chose to include in the stipulated record.7 Although stipulations 
are convenient, productive and result in cost-savings, parties retain an obligation to 
ensure that all relevant facts they wish the Board or an ALJ to consider are contained in 
the administrative record. The failure to set forth necessary facts in a stipulation or to call 
a relevant witness in support of a claim or defense can have obvious adverse 
consequences for a party. For example, in City of Oswego,8 we modified a proposed 
make-whole remedial order when the stipulated record failed to include facts supporting 
a portion of the remedial order. 
We, therefore, deny the City's exceptions challenging the Assistant Director's 
conclusions predicated on her factual findings and turn to the City's legal argument that 
the Assistant Director erred in failing to conclude that the subject matter of the charge is 
a prohibited subject. 
B. Police Discipline is not a Prohibited Subject in the City of Albany 
We conclude that the subject of the unilateral change in the present case is not a 
prohibited subject based upon the following grounds: three decades of relevant 
precedent establishing that police discipline in the City of Albany is a mandatory subject 
of negotiations; New York public policy, as reflected in the text and legislative history of 
7
 CSEA (Paganini), 36 PERB P006 (2003); Margolin v Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 
PERB ^7018 (3d Dept 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). 
8
 41 PERB1J3011 (2008). 
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the Act; the provisions of the Second Class Cities Law have been superseded by the 
Act; and the Albany City Code, a local law, does not preempt the Act. 
(B)(1) Applicable Precedent with Respect to Negotiability of City Police Discipline 
Thirty-five years ago, in City of Albany,9 the Board first concluded that police 
discipline in the City is a mandatory subject of negotiations, but only if the proposal did 
not deny affected employees their statutory right to the alternative of Civ Serv Law §§75 
and 76 procedures. At that time, the City did not dispute the applicability of Civ Serv 
Law §§75 and 76 to its police officers. Neither did it argue that the Second Class Cities 
Law or its local law rendered police discipline a prohibited subject of negotiations. 
Rather, it argued that the 1974 amendment to the Act10 providing for compulsory 
interest arbitration to resolve police negotiation impasses required the Board to apply a 
restrictive approach with respect to the negotiability of all police terms and conditions of 
employment. In rejecting this argument, the Board stated: 
L.1974, Chapter 725 contains no language imposing 
restrictions upon the scope of negotiations. Neither 
does the legislative history of the amendment 
indicate any intention that the phrase "terms and 
conditions of employment" should be interpreted 
more narrowly after its enactment than it had been 
before.11 
9
 7 PERB1J3078 (1974), 7 PERB 1J3079 (1974), confirmed sub nom., City of Albany v 
Helsby, 48 AD2d 998, 8 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dept 1975), affd 38 NY2d 778, 9 PERB 
117005 (1975). See also, Marsh v Hartley, 50 AD2d 687 (3d Dept 1975); DeMarco v City 
of Albany, 75 AD2d 674 (3d Dept 1980) (where Civ Serv Law §75 procedures were the 
subject of litigation involving City police discipline). 
10
 L 1974, c 725. 
11
 7 PERB P078 at 3134. 
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In the City's court challenge to the Board's 1974 decision, the City did not seek 
to overturn the Board's conclusion that police discipline is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations under the Act, and, therefore, that subject was not reached by the courts. 
In 1977, the Appellate Division, Third Department confirmed another Board 
decision which held that a new City police disciplinary rule, with respect to time and 
attendance, constituted a mandatory subject under the Act and that the City's unilateral 
imposition of the new rule constituted a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act.12 In 
confirming the Board's decision, the Appellate Division deferred to the Board's analysis, 
cited to the Board's earlier City of Albany decision and affirmed that police discipline in 
the City is mandatorily negotiable under the Act.13 
Two years later, the Court of Appeals, in Auburn Police Local 195 vHelsby 
(hereinafter Auburn)u affirmed the reversal of a Board decision15 which had held that a 
proposal to negotiate an alternative to Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76, for City of Auburn 
police officers, was a prohibited subject. The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of 
the Appellate Division's decision16 that relied, in part, on the Board's earlier City of 
12
 City of Albany, 9 PERB jf3009 (1976), confirmed sub nom., City of Albany v Helsby 
56 AD2d 976, 10 PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 1977). See also, City of Buffalo (Police Dept), 
supra, note 3 (police disciplinary rules of conduct are negotiable). 
13
 56 AD2d at 977, 10 PERB 1J7006 at 7012. 
14
 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB 1J7006 (1979). 
15
 Auburn Police Local 195, 10 PERB 1J3045 (1977). 
16
 Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82 AFSCME v Helsby, 62 AD2d 12, 11 PERB 
U7003 (3d Dept 1978). 
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Albany police discipline decisions, to conclude that the proposal was not prohibited and 
that a negotiated agreement can supercede Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76.17 
(B)(2) Positions of the Parties and Amici on the Issue of Prohibition 
In its exceptions, the City contends that the Second Class Cities Law §§133 and 
141, Albany City Code Chapter 42, §42-6(b), the Court of Appeals' 2006 decision in 
NYCPBA and other case law, renders City police discipline a prohibited subject. 
In support of its exceptions, the City does not distinguish, or even mention, the 
above-referenced precedent holding police discipline in the City to be a mandatory 
subject. Nor does the City discuss the Board's decision in Tarrytown Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (hereinafter, Tarrytown),™ specifically relied upon by the 
Assistant Director, where we held that under NYCPBA a special law applicable to 
Village police departments preempted the negotiability of police discipline in the Town of 
Tarrytown. In Tarrytown, we concluded that NYCPBA holds that a special State law, 
enacted prior to Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76(4), granting specific local officials the power 
and authority over police discipline, preempts the negotiability of police discipline under 
the Act in that municipality.19 Furthermore, we referenced the text and legislative history 
17
 L 1970, c 458; L 1972, c 283. The Court of Appeals, in DePaulo v City of Albany, 49 
NY2d 994 (1980) also concluded that a disciplinary arbitrator's decision and award 
suspending, rather than terminating a City police officer for filing a false report did not 
violate New York public policy. Notably, the Court did not find the arbitrator's decision 
to be repugnant to a New York policy that favors granting strong police disciplinary 
authority to public officials in certain jurisdictions. 
18
 40 PERB U3024 (2007). 
19
 40 PERB P024 at 3102; 40 PERB P024, note 27 (Village Law provision, however, 
does not preempt negotiability). 
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of the Act, with respect to police officers, to support our conclusion that NYCPBA should 
be read narrowly.20 
In opposition to the City's exceptions and in support of the Assistant Director's 
decision, Council 82 relies upon Tarrytown and Elias v Town of Crawford2^ (hereinafter 
Crawford) in arguing that the Second Class Cities Law, as a general law, does not 
render police discipline a prohibited subject of negotiations under NYCPBA. In 
Crawford, a Supreme Court justice held that another general law, Town Law §155, does 
not render police discipline a prohibited subject in the Town of Crawford under 
NYCPBA. In addition, Council 82 contends that the Albany City Code, as a local law, 
does not preempt the negotiability of police discipline under the Act. 
All three amici support the City's position that the Second Class Cities Law and 
the Albany City Code render police discipline a prohibited subject. 
One amicus highlights the significance of the issue before us by noting that the 
Second Class Cities Law is applicable to other cities within New York. While 
acknowledging that the holding in NYCPBA was limited to specific police disciplinary 
authority granted local officials in the City of New York and towns subject to the 
Rockland County Police Act (hereinafter RCPA), that amicus argues that there is no 
reasonable basis for interpreting NYCPBA to be limited to grants of police disciplinary 
authority through special legislation rather than general legislation. 
A second amicus asserts that the Board in Tarrytown unjustifiably interpreted 
NYCPBA narrowly by drawing an unwarranted distinction between local police 
20
 40 PERB P024 at 3104-3105, note 14. See also, City of New York, 40 PERB fl3017, 
note 53 (2007). 
21
 17 Misc3d 176, 41 PERB fi7505 (Sup Ct, Orange County 2007). 
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disciplinary authority granted by a special, as opposed to, a general law. In addition, it 
asserts that the Board in Tarrytown, and the Assistant Director in the present case, 
have ignored the public policy expressed by the Legislature in the Second Class Cities 
Law and the Albany City Code which grant local disciplinary control over the police. In 
support of its position, the second amicus asserts that Second Class Cities Law §133 
contains terms that parallel the statutory language contained in RCPA and the New 
York City Charter and Code interpreted in NYCPBA. 
The third amicus also questions the Board's Tarrytown analysis. According to the 
third amicus, distinctions between general, special or local laws are irrelevant based on 
what it contends is the clear and plain meaning of NYCPBA. It asserts, in essence, that 
the sole issue under NYCPBA, in determining the negotiability of local police discipline, 
is one of simple statutory chronology. Under this methodology, any State or local law, 
predating the 1958 enactment of Civ Serv Law §§75 and 76, expressly granting police 
disciplinary authority to local officials, preempts negotiability under the Act. It also relies 
upon the following dicta in NYS Troopers PBA v Division of New York Police22 where 
the Court stated: 
While the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law § 200 et seq.) requires 
public employers to bargain in good faith concerning all terms 
and conditions of employment (Matter of City of Watertown v. 
State ofN.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 N.Y.2d 73, 78 
[2000]), when legislation commits police discipline to the 
discretion of local authorities, as a matter of public policy, 
discipline is a prohibited subject of collective bargaining (Matter 
of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. ofCityofN.Y., Inc. v. New 
York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd, 6 N.Y.3d 563 [2006]). 
11 NY3d 96, 102, 41 PERB 1J7511 at 7543 (2008). 
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(B)(3) Relevant Statutory Text and Legislative History of the Act 
The Legislature, in defining the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in 
§201.4 of the Act, did not draw a distinction between police officers and other public 
employees, but mandated negotiations for "salaries, wages and hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment" other than pension benefits. The Legislature also 
granted public employers the statutory authority under §204.1 of the Act,23 to negotiate 
over terms and conditions of employment without distinguishing between police officers 
in local government and other public employees. 
In 1974, the Legislature amended §209.2 and enacted §209:4 of the Act to add 
compulsory interest arbitration as the final and binding procedure for resolving collective 
negotiation impasses with respect to all terms and conditions of employment of police 
officers of any county, city (except the City of New York), town, village or police 
district.24 
Since 1974, the Legislature has not amended §§201.4 or 204.1 of the Act to 
exclude the subject of police discipline from the negotiations for police officers of 
Section 204.1 of the Act provides: 
"Public employers are hereby empowered to recognize 
employee organizations for the purpose of negotiating collectively 
in the determination of, and administration of grievances arising 
under, the terms and conditions of employment of their public 
employees as provided in this article, and to negotiate and enter 
into written agreements with such employee organizations in 
determining such terms and conditions of employment." 
L1974, c725. 
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counties, cities, towns, villages and police districts. In contrast, the Legislature has 
enacted a series of amendments to §§209.2 and 209.4 of the Act extending compulsory 
interest arbitration for negotiation impasses with respect to other police, law enforcement 
and correctional bargaining units but expressly precluding the subject of disciplinary 
procedures from being determined by compulsory interest arbitration panels for those 
units.26 The repeated choice of the Legislature to exclude negotiation impasses over 
disciplinary procedures from compulsory interest arbitration for those particular police, 
law enforcement and correctional units, while not excluding the subject from final 
determination by interest arbitration panels for other police officer units, supports the 
conclusion that the Legislature intended the Act to permit police discipline to be a subject 
of negotiations and the impasse procedures, in general, under the Act. It is well-settled 
that when a statute identifies the specific situation in which it is to apply "an irrefutable 
inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted 
or excluded."27 
While both Governors Spitzer and Paterson have vetoed legislation aimed at 
amending §§201.4 and 204-a of the Act in response to the holding and dicta in 
NYCPBA, their respective veto messages demonstrate that their disapprovals were 
based on what both Governors concluded were defects in the bills rather than a 
substantive disagreement with the Legislature over public policy. Governor Spitzer Veto 
Message No.1 of 2007; Governor Spitzer Veto Message No. 96 of 2007; and Governor 
Paterson Veto Message No. 44 of 2008. 
26
 See, L 1995, c 432; L 1995, c 447; L. 2001, c 586; L 2002, c 220; L 2002, c 232; L 
2003, c 641; L 2003, c 696; L 2004, c 63; L 2005, c 737; L 2007, c 190; L 2008, c 179; L 
2008, c 234; §§209.4(e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of the Act. See also, County of Suffolk and 
Suffolk County Sheriff, 40 PERB 1J3022 (2007). 
27
 Statutes §240; PBA of the City of New York v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208-
209(1976). 
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Furthermore, in 2007, the Legislature enacted §209-a.1(g) of the Act with respect 
to disciplinary procedures and collective negotiations that does not exempt from 
coverage police officers or any other public employee as that term is defined in 
§201.7(a) of the Act.28 This amendment demonstrates a legislative recognition that 
disciplinary procedures are subject to collective negotiations and impasse procedures 
under the Act for police and quasi-law enforcement personnel. 
B(4) The Applicability of NYCPBA to the Second Class Cities Law and Albany 
City Code 
In NYCPBA, the Court held that the special State legislation under consideration 
in that case, the New York City Charter and Administrative Code and RCPA, 
demonstrates a public policy, established by the Legislature, that outweighs New York's 
strong and sweeping policy supporting collective negotiations under the Act. Contrary to 
the arguments by amici, the Court in NYCPBA did not hold that every state or local law 
granting police disciplinary authority to local authorities, which pre-dates Civ Serv Law 
§§75 and 76, eliminates the duty to negotiate under the Act. For example, in discussing 
the provisions of the New York City Charter and Administrative Code in NYCPBA, the 
Court emphasized that both provisions were originally enacted by the State Legislature.2 
In its decision, the Court in NYCPBA affirmed the Appellate Division, Second 
Department's decision in Town of Orangetown v Orangetown PBA,30 holding that the 
RCPA, as a special law, preempts negotiability. In addition, the Court cited with favor 
prior Appellate Division decisions that had "held that legislation of this kind overcomes 
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the presumption in favor of collective bargaining where police discipline is concerned. 
(emphasis added) Each of the Appellate Division decisions cited in NYCPBA 
determined that a special law delegating police discipline to local officials rendered 
police disciplinary procedures in that locality a prohibited subject under the Act.32 
Following the example of the Appellate Division, First Department in City of New 
York v Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York (NYCPBA II)33 we 
do not read the holding of the Court of Appeals in NYCPBA broadly. In that case, the 
First Department, based upon its careful construction of the police investigatory 
authority delegated to the Police Commissioner by the New York City Administrative 
Code, distinguished NYCPA and ruled that the authority delegated to the Commissioner 
did not preclude the negotiability of a police drug testing procedure which was only 
tangential to police discipline. 
We read the decision in NYCPBA in conjunction with the Act's statutory text and 
legislative history along with the three decades of prior judicial and Board precedent 
holding police discipline to be a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act. The 
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Legislature's failure to amend §§201.4, 204.1 and 209.4 of the Act to exclude police 
discipline from the definition of the terms and conditions of employment subject to 
negotiations and mediation, while at the same time excluding police disciplinary 
procedures from compulsory interest arbitration for only certain police units, 
demonstrates, that except where the Legislature, through a special law, has delegated 
police discipline to a public employer, it is the intent of the Legislature that police 
discipline be a mandatory subject of negotiations.34 
The express terms of the Second Class Cities Law §§4 and 133, however, makes 
it unnecessary for us to reach the issue of whether the Second Class Cities Law 
constitutes a special or general law under NYCPBA. Second Class Cities Law §4 
explicitly permits police disciplinary authority under that law to be superceded by 
subsequent legislation. The enactment of the Act in 1967, along with its subsequent 
amendments, represent the superceding of the Second Class Cities Law by requiring 
police discipline to be subject to both collective negotiations and impasse procedures 
under the Act. Therefore, we conclude that the obligations under the Act are not 
preempted by the public policy established by the 1909 law. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the City's argument premised on 
Chapter 42, Section 42-6(B) of the Albany City Code. This provision was originally 
enacted by the City in 1936, as Local Law No. 2, §10, and amended in 1985. It 
authorizes and empowers the Chief of Police to enforce rules and regulations relating to . 
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discipline of police officers. The City argues that the Code provision is similar to the 
provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and Charter examined in NYCBA. 
However, unlike the New York City provisions, the Albany City Code provision was not 
originally enacted or adopted by the State Legislature and therefore cannot preempt the 
public policy underlying the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the City's exceptions and affirm, as modified, 
the decision of the Assistant Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City of Albany forthwith: 
1. Rescind the work rule which prohibits the consumption of intoxicating 
beverages by unit employees within eight-hours of reporting for their 
regular tours of duty; 
2. Restore the prior practice regarding the off-duty consumption of 
intoxicating beverages by unit employees in relation to reporting for their 
regular tours of duty; 
3. Make whole any unit employees against whom the eight-hour prohibition 
has been applied since its May 31, 2006 promulgation until such time as 
said work rule is rescinded, including expunging their work records of any 
reference thereto, with, as applicable, interest at the maximum legal rate; 
and 
4. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations normally used 
by it to post written communications for unit employees. 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
i*n*L~ 
Jerome/.efkow/Hz, Chairman 
Z-Q/-£ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
Albany City Code, c 42, §42-6(B). 
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CONCURRING DECISION BY MEMBER HUE 
I concur in the result reached, and the analysis contained, in Part A of the 
majority's discussion. However, I believe that Part B of the majority's discussion goes 
beyond what is necessary in order to render a determination in this case. 
I believe that the at-issue rule involving off-duty conduct is not a prohibited 
subject because it is only tangentially related to disciplinary procedures and, therefore, 
consistent with the Appellate Division, First Department's reasoning set forth in its 
decision in NYCPBA II,361 do not find it necessary for the Board to address the other 
issues set forth in Part B of the majority's discussion. 
In NYCPBA II, the Appellate Division, First Department explicitly refused to read 
the opinion in NYCPBA as adopting the view that the power of the New York City Police 
Commissioner to implement the drug testing procedures without resort to collective 
negotiations extends to matters that are ancillary or only tangentially related to his 
disciplinary function. In my opinion, the eight-hour rule in the present case is a rule of 
off-duty conduct that is ancillary to the City's prerogative to investigate misconduct and 
implement disciplinary proceedings against a member of the City's police department. 
Consequently, I do not believe that it is necessary for the Board to engage in any further 
analysis regarding whether the City's eight-hour rule is a prohibited subject under 
NYCPBA. 
Robert S. Hitl, Board Member 
DATED: April 22, 2009 
Albany, New York 
Supra, note 33. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Albany in the unit represented by 
New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Local 2841 that the City of Albany will forthwith: 
1. Rescind the work rule which prohibits the consumption of intoxicating 
beverages by unit employees within eight-hours of reporting for their regular 
tours of duty; 
2. Restore the prior practice regarding the off-duty consumption of intoxicating 
beverages by unit employees in relation to reporting for their regular tours of 
duty; and 
3. Make whole any unit employees against whom the eight-hour prohibition has 
been applied since its May 31, 2006 promulgation until such time as said 
work rule is rescinded, including expunging their work records of any 
reference thereto, with, as applicable, interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
on behalf of City of Albany 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
